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Abstract
The study of probabilistic secret sharing schemes using arbitrary probability spaces and
possibly infinite number of participants lets us investigate abstract properties of such schemes.
It highlights important properties, explains why certain definitions work better than others,
connects this topic to other branches of mathematics, and might yield new design paradigms.
A probabilistic secret sharing scheme is a joint probability distribution of the shares and
the secret together with a collection of secret recovery functions for qualified subsets. The
scheme is measurable if the recovery functions are measurable. Depending on how much
information an unqualified subset might have, we define four scheme types: perfect, almost
perfect, ramp, and almost ramp. Our main results characterize the access structures which
can be realized by schemes of these types.
We show that every access structure can be realized by a non-measurable perfect prob-
abilistic scheme. The construction is based on a paradoxical pair of independent random
variables which determine each other.
For measurable schemes we have the following complete characterization. An access struc-
ture can be realized by a (measurable) perfect, or almost perfect scheme if and only if the
access structure, as a subset of the Sierpin´ski space {0, 1}P , is open, if and only if it can be
realized by a span program. The access structure can be realized by a (measurable) ramp or
almost ramp scheme if and only if the access structure is a Gδ set (intersection of countably
many open sets) in the Sierpin´ski topology, if and only if it can be realized by a Hilbert-space
program.
Keywords: secret sharing; probability space; Sierpin´ski topology; product measure; span
program; Hilbert space program.
AMS classification numbers: 60B05, 94A62, 46C99, 54D10
1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is to study secret sharing schemes where the domain of the secret, the
domain of the shares, or the set of players are not necessarily finite. This type of approach studying
infinite objects instead of finitary ones is not novel even in the realm of cryptography, see, e.g.,
[3, 5, 12, 13, 14]. Further motivation and several examples can be found in the companion paper
[7]. As can be expected, even finding the right definitions can be hard and far from trivial, we
elaborate on this issue in Section 6.
Secret sharing has several faces. In particular, it can be investigated equally from either com-
binatorial or probabilistic point of view, see, for example, the survey paper [2]. The combinatorial
view leads to set theoretical generalizations which are discussed in [6]. In this paper we take the
probabilistic view and consider secret sharing schemes as (joint) probability distributions of shares
and the secret. Defining probability measures on arbitrary (product) spaces is not without prob-
lems, see [1, 8, 15] for a general description of the problems, especially how and when conditional
distribution can be defined. Our definitions avoid referring to conditional distributions at the
∗This research has been partially supported by the “Lendu¨let” Program.
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expense of a less transparent and less intuitive formulation of the concept. In Sections 2.3 and
2.4 we give all necessary definitions from Probability Theory we will use later on. Nevertheless, a
good working knowledge of measure theory and probability spaces, as can be found, e.g., in [10],
definitely helps.
A basic requirement in secret sharing is that qualified subsets should be able to recover the
secret. The most straightforward way to ensure this property is via recovery functions: for each
qualified subsets A there is a function hA which, given the shares of members of A, gives the
value of the secret. In the classical case, recovery functions only affect the efficiency of the system.
Quite surprisingly, this is far from the truth in general. In Section 3 we present a scheme in
which every share determines the secret, while every collection of the shares is independent of the
secret, i.e. “gives no information on the secret.” The usual way to avoid such “uninteresting” or
“pathological” cases is requiring the relevant functions to be measurable. This is exactly what we
do here: we focus on measurable schemes where recovery functions are measurable.
Depending on how much information an unqualified subset might have on the secret, we define
four types. In perfect schemes unqualified subsets should have no information at all, meaning
that the conditional distribution of the secret, given the shares of the subset, is the same as the
unconditional distribution. The scheme is almost perfect, if for some constant c ≥ 1 the ratio of
the conditional and unconditional probabilities is always between 1/c and c. An almost perfect
scheme with c = 1 is perfect. Almost perfect schemes were introduced in [5] where they were
called “c-scheme.”
We call a scheme ramp when the constant which bounds the ratio of conditional and uncon-
ditional probabilities should not be uniform but might depend on the unqualified set (but not on
the value of the actual shares). Finally the scheme is almost ramp if the constant might depend
on the value of the actual value of the shares. In the last case the condition can be rephrased as
unqualified subsets cannot exclude any value of the secret with positive probability.
In Sections 4 and 5 we characterize the access structures which can be realized by schemes
of these types. We have both topological and structural characterizations. Subsets of P can be
considered as points in the product space {0, 1}P , therefore access structures are subsets of this
space. Equipping {0, 1} with some topology, we can speak about topological properties of access
structures. The Sierpin´ski topology [17] is especially promising, as it has some intriguing properties
used in logic. In our case, when P is finite, a structure in the Sierpin´ski topology is open if and
only if it is upward closed. For definitions and examples for this topology, see Section 2.2. We
prove that a scheme can be realized by a perfect, or by an almost perfect, scheme if and only if it
is open. Similarly, a scheme can be realized by a ramp, or by an almost ramp, scheme if and only
if the scheme is Gδ, that is, the intersection of countably many open sets.
The structural characterization uses span programs introduced in [11] and its generalization,
Hilbert-space programs. In a span program we are given a vector space, a target vector, and every
participant is assigned one or more vectors. A structure realized by the span program consists of
those subsets or participants whose vectors span the target vector. In a Hilbert-space program the
vector space is replaced by a Hilbert space, and a subset is realized if the target vector is in the
closure of the linear span of their vectors. We prove that exactly the open structures are realizable
by a span program, and exactly the Gδ structures are realizable by Hilbert-space programs.
Finally Section 6 concludes the paper, where we show that not every access structure is real-
izable, discuss further scheme types, and list some open problems.
2 Definitions
In this section we present the main definitions. We start with access structures, then continue
with the Sierpin´ski topology, and show how this topology can be used. Then we give the definition
of probability secret sharing scheme, and enlist some properties of probability on product spaces.
Finally we define different types of schemes depending on how much information an unqualified
subset might have. Due to the lack of space, motivations for some of the definitions can be found
in the companion paper [7].
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2.1 Access structure
An access structure is a non-trivial upward closed family of subsets of the set P of participants:
A ⊂ 2P . To avoid certain trivialities, we assume that A dos not contain any singletons, and is not
empty. Given A0 ⊂ 2
P , the structure generated by A0 is defined as
gen(A0)
def
= {A ⊆ P : B ⊆ A for some B ∈ A0 }.
By the monotonicity property, an access structure is determined uniquely by any of its generators.
The access structure A is finitely generated if it generated by a collection of finite subsets of P .
2.2 Sierpin´ski topology
The Sierpin´ski space SP is a topological space defined on the two element set {0, 1}, where the
open sets are the empty set, {1}, and {0, 1}, see [17]. This topology is T0, but not T1, and is
universal in the sense that every T0 space can be embedded into a high enough power of SP.
Consider the product space SPP ; its elements are the characteristic functions of subsets of P , so
these points can be identified with subsets of P . Thus a collection A of subsets of P naturally
corresponds to a subset of the topological space SPP . The following claim is an easy consequence
of the definition of the product topology.
Claim 2.1. The collection A ⊆ 2P is open in SPP if and only if it is a finitely generated monotone
structure.
In particular, if P is finite, then a non-trivial A ⊂ 2P is an access structure if and only if it is
open.
As in connection with access structures only the Sierpin´ski topology is used, we tacitly assume
that all topological notions in this paper refer to this topology.
Definition 2.2. A set A ⊆ 2P is Gδ if it is the intersection of countably many open sets.
Claim 2.3. A ⊆ 2P is Gδ if and only if there are families B1 ⊇ B2 ⊇ · · · consisting of finite
subsets of P such that
A ∈ A ⇔ A ∈ gen(Bi) for all i,
or, in other words, A =
⋂
i gen(Bi).
Proof. As Bi has only finite elements, gen(Bi) is open, and then
⋂
i gen(Bi) is Gδ.
In the other direction, assume A =
⋂
Ui, where Ui is open. Define Vi =
⋂
{Uj : j ≤ i}, and
Bi
def
= {A ⊆ P : A ∈ Vi, A is finite }.
As Vi is open, Vi = gen(Bi), and, of course, A =
⋂
i Vi as well. Moreover Vi+1 ⊆ Vi, thus Vi
contains every finite set what Vi+1 does.
As an example, suppose P is infinite, and let A be the family of all infinite subsets of P . Then
A is not open, but it is Gδ: it is the intersection of the families generated by the n-element subsets
of P , all of which are open.
For another example let A1, A2, . . . be disjoint infinite subsets of P , and let A be the family
generated by these subsets. Then A is upward closed, but it is not Gδ. To show this, suppose
otherwise, and let B1 ⊇ B2 ⊇ · · · be the families as in Claim 2.3. As Ai ∈ A ⊆ gen(Bi), there is a
(finite) Bi ∈ Bi with Bi ⊆ Ai. Consider the set B =
⋃
iBi. Clearly B ∈ gen(Bi), as Bi ∈ Bi is
a subset of B, thus B ∈
⋂
i gen(Bi). On the other hand, B ∩ Ai = Bi is finite, thus B does not
extend any Ai, and therefore it is not an element of A.
In the third example we have countably many forbidden subsets F1, F2, . . ., and A consists of
those subsets which are not covered by any of the forbidden sets:
A = {A ⊆ P : A 6⊆ Fi, i = 1, 2, . . .}.
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A is obviously upward closed, and it is also Gδ. To conclude so, it is enough to show that
An = {A ⊆ P : A 6⊆ Fi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n }
is open, as clearly A =
⋂
iAi. But A ∈ An iff A has a point outside F1, a point outside F2, . . . , a
point outside Fn. That is, A has a subset with at most n elements which is also in An. Therefore
An is finitely generated, that is, it is open.
2.3 Probabilistic secret sharing scheme
A secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute some kind of information among the participants
so that qualified subsets could recover the secret’s value from their shares, while forbidden subset
should have no, or only limited, information on the secret. In probabilistic schemes the shares and
the secret come from a (joint) probability distribution on the product space of the corresponding
domains.
Definition 2.4. The domain of secrets is denoted by Xs, and the domain of shares for the
participant i ∈ P is denoted by Xi. We always assume that none of these sets is empty, and Xs
has at least two elements, i.e. there is indeed a secret to be distributed.
To make our notation simpler, we denote P ∪ {s} by I for the set of indices. If A ⊆ P then
As denotes the set A∪{s}. In particular, I = Ps. We shall put X =
∏
i∈I Xi, and for any subset
J ⊆ I we let XJ =
∏
i∈J Xi to be the restriction of X into coordinates in J .
Informally, a probabilistic secret sharing scheme is a probability distribution on the set X =∏
i∈I Xi together with a collection of “recovery functions.” Equivalently, it can be considered as
a collection of random variables {ξi : i ∈ I} with some joint distribution so that ξi takes values
from Xi. The share of participant i ∈ P is the value of ξi, and the secret is the value of ξs.
Definition 2.5. A probabilistic secret sharing scheme is a pair S = 〈µ, h〉, where
µ is a probability measure on the product space X =
∏
i∈I Xi, where I = P ∪ {s}, Xs is the set
of (possible) secrets, and, for i ∈ P , Xi is the set of (possible) shares for participant i; and
h is the collection of recovery functions: for each qualified A ⊆ P the function hA : X
A → Xs
tells the secret given the shares of members of A.
When the dealer uses the scheme S = 〈µ, h〉, she simply chooses an element x ∈ X according
to the given distribution µ, sets the secret to be ξs = x(s), the s-coordinate of x, and gives the
participant i ∈ P the share ξi = x(i), the i-coordinate of x.
When members of A ⊆ P want to recover the secret, they simply use the recovery function hA
on their shares to pinpoint the secret value.
Of course, we want qualified subsets to recover the secret from their shares. A scheme realizes
an access structure, if this is indeed the case, at least with probability 1. To formalize this notion,
we look at all possible distribution of shares and the secret where the secret is computed according
to the recovery function hA. When x ∈ X is such a distribution, then the projection piA(x) is
its restriction to coordinates (indices) in A, thus the recovery function gives the secret value
hA(piA(x)) ∈ Xs. So xs should be equal to this value, and the probability of those sequences x for
which this happens must be 1.
Definition 2.6. The scheme S = 〈µ, h〉 realizes the access structure A ⊂ 2P , if for all A ∈ A,
µ
(
{x ∈ X : hA(piA(x)) = xs}
)
= 1.
Recovery functions are determined almost uniquely by the distribution µ. Indeed, let hA and h
∗
A
be two recovery functions. The set of those points where hA and h
∗
A and differ is a subset of
{x ∈ X : hA(piA(x)) 6= xs} ∪ {x ∈ X : h
∗
A(piA(x)) 6= xs},
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and, by assumption, both sets have measure zero. Also, recovery functions are coherent in the
following sense: if A is qualified and A ⊆ B, then h∗B(y) = hA(piA(y)) is also a recovery function
mapping shares of B into the proper secrets, thus it must be equal to hB almost everywhere.
In a secret sharing scheme we also want unqualified subsets have no, or limited information
on the secret. As the precise definitions require some preparations from Probability Theory, we
postpone them to Section 2.5.
2.4 Probability measure on product spaces
As usual in probability theory [10], the definition of a probability measure µ on the space X =∏
iXi requires a σ-algebra Σ on X . Let J be a subset of I, then X
J =
∏
i∈J Xi. A cylinder is
a set of the form C = U ×
∏
i/∈J Xi where U ⊆
∏
i∈J Xi is the base of the cylinder, and J is its
support. Let moreover
ΣJ =
{
E ⊆ XJ : (E ×
∏
i6∈J
Xi) ∈ Σ
}
.
It is easy to check that ΣJ is a σ-algebra on XJ . For each J ⊂ I the projection function piJ maps
any element x ∈ X into XJ keeping only those coordinates of x which are in J . With this notation
a subset E of XJ is in Σ
J if and only if its inverse image under piJ is in Σ, namely, if pi
−1
J (E) ∈ Σ.
The σ-algebra Σ should be generated by its finite-support cylinders, i.e. all sets from Σ of the
form
U ×
∏
i/∈J
Xi, where J is finite and U ∈ Σ
J .
Let µ be a probability measure on the 〈X,Σ〉 space. Elements of Σ are the events, and the
probability of the event E ∈ Σ is just µ(E). As usual, µ is completed, i.e., not only elements of
Σ have probability, but subsets of zero probability sets are also measurable. This means that for
each µ-measurable U ⊆ X there is a V ∈ Σ such that the symmetric difference of U and V is a
µ-zero set (i.e., subset of a set in Σ with µ-measure zero).
For a subset J ⊆ I the marginal probability is provided by the probability measure µJ defined
on XJ as follows. E ⊆ XJ is µJ -measurable iff pi−1J (E) is µ-measurable, and
µJ(E) = µ
(
pi−1J (E)
)
.
If J has a single element J = {j} then we also denote µ{j} as µj . In particular, µs is the marginal
measure on the set of secrets. With this notation, if C is a cylinder with support J and base
U ∈ ΣJ , then µ(C) = µJ(U).
As the probability measure µ determines the joint distribution of the random variables ξi for
i ∈ I (that is the σ-algebra Σ on the whole space X as well as the σ-algebras on eachXJ) uniquely,
we can, and will, use this measure µ only when defining a probabilistic secret sharing scheme.
The following essential facts about probability measures will be used frequently and without
further notice through this paper.
Claim 2.7. a) For each E ∈ Σ there is a countable set J ⊆ I such that E = pi−1J
(
piJ(E)
)
, that
is, E is a cylinder with countable support.
b) For any µ-measurable set E ⊆ X and any J ⊆ I, µJ
(
piJ (E)
)
≥ µ(E).
c) For any µ-measurable E ⊆ X and ε > 0 there is a cylinder E′ with finite support such that
µ(E − E′) = 0, and µ(E′ − E) < ε.
d) For any µ-measurable E ⊆ X and ε > 0 there is a finite J ⊆ I such that µ(E) ≤
µJ(piJ (E)) < µ(E) + ε.
Proof. a) Cylinders with finite support have the stated property. Also, this property is preserved by
taking complements and countable unions. Thus all elements in the smallest σ-algebra generated
by finite support cylinders have the property claimed.
b) The statement is immediate from the fact that pi−1J
(
piJ(E)
)
⊇ E.
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c) By part a), any µ-measurable E ⊆ X is, up to a set of measure zero, a cylinder C with
countable support. Thus it is the intersection of the finite support cylinders Cn = pi
−1
Jn
(
piJn(C)
)
where Jn is the set of first n elements of the support of C. As Cn+1 ⊆ Cn, limn→∞ µ(Cn) = µ(C)
decreasingly, and the claim follows.
d) The first inequality comes from b). By c), there is a cylinder E′ with finite support such
that E − E′ is a zero set, while µ(E′) < µ(E) + ε/2. As µ(E − E′) = 0, there is a zero set
Z ∈ Σ such that Z ⊇ E − E′. By a) Z is a cylinder with countable support, thus there is a
finite support cylinder E′′ ⊇ Z with µ(E′′) < ε/2. Let J be the (finite) support of E′ ∪ E′′, then
µJ(piJ (E
′)) = µ(E′) and µJ (piJ (E
′′)) = µ(E′′). As E ⊆ E′ ∪ Z ⊆ E′ ∪ E′′,
µJ(piJ (E)) ≤ µ
J(piJ (E
′ ∪ E′′))
≤ µJ(piJ (E
′)) + µJ(piJ (E
′′)) = µ(E′) + µ(E′′)
< (µ(E) + ε/2) + ε/2 = µ(E) + ε,
as was required.
Let B ⊆ P be any subset of participants. The collective set of shares they receive will fall
into the set U ⊆ XB with probability µB(U). Similarly, if E ⊆ Xs then the probability that the
secret falls into E is µs(E). The conditional probability distribution of the secret assuming that
the shares of B comes from the set U with µB(U) > 0 is defined as
µs(E|U) =
µBs(U × E)
µB(E)
.
Here we wrote Bs for B ∪ {s}. Observe that µs(E|XB) = µs(E), and µs(·|U) is a probability
measure on Xs.
It would be tempting to define the conditional distribution given not a (measurable) subset
of the shares, but the shares themselves. Unfortunately such conditional distributions not always
exist [4], nevertheless in statistics their existence is almost always assumed. Fortunately, at the
expense of a bit more complicated and less intuitive formulation, we can avoid the usage if those
conditional distributions.
2.5 Perfect schemes, ramp schemes, and everything in between
When using a secret sharing scheme, unqualified subsets of the participants are required to have
no information, or at least limited information on the secret. Depending on what this requirement
is exactly, we distinguish several different type of schemes.
Definition 2.8. Let S = 〈µ, h〉 be a secret sharing scheme on the set P of participants. We call
the scheme perfect, almost perfect, ramp, or almost ramp scheme, if the collective shares of any
unqualified subset B ⊆ P satisfies the condition listed below:
• perfect: B gets no information on the secret. In other words, the collective shares of B
and the secret are (statistically) independent. That is, for every measurable U ⊆ XB and
E ⊆ Xs,
µBs(U × E) = µB(U) · µs(E).
This fact can be expressed as the conditional probability µs(·|U) coincides with µs(·) for all
U ⊆ XB with µB(U) > 0.
• almost perfect: for all unqualified B the conditional probabilities µs(·|U) might deviate
from µs(·) by a constant factor only, i.e. for some positive constant c ≥ 1 (independently of
B, depending only on the scheme)
1
c
· µB(U) · µs(E) ≤ µ
Bs(U × E) ≤ c · µB(U) · µs(E) (1)
for all measurable U ⊆ XB and E ⊆ Xs.
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• ramp: the constant c = cB in (1) might depend on the subset B (but, of course, should not
depend on U and E).
• almost ramp: based on their collective shares, no subset of the secrets with positive measure
can be excluded:
µB(U) · µs(E) > 0 implies µ
Bs(U × E) > 0
(observe that the inverse implication always holds).
These definitions extend the usual ones for classical secret sharing schemes. In perfect schemes
the collection of shares of any unqualified set is statistically independent of the secret, which is
the traditional requirement. Almost perfect schemes were introduced [5], where an almost perfect
scheme with constant c was called a “c scheme.” There is no universally accepted definition for
ramp schemes, the best approach is that in a ramp scheme under no circumstances an unqualified
subset should be able to recover the secret. Our last two definitions reflect this idea. However,
see the discussion in Section 6.
When S is traditional, namely the number of participants is finite and both the shares and
the secret come from a finite domain (that is, X is finite), then the conditions for almost perfect,
ramp, and almost ramp schemes are equivalent, while there are (traditional) schemes which are
almost perfect, but not perfect.
Claim 2.9. The types above are listed in decreasing strength, namely
perfect ⇒ almost perfect ⇒ ramp ⇒ almost ramp.
None of the implications can be reversed.
Proof. It is not difficult to construct schemes witnessing the irreversibility of these implications,
see [7].
3 Non-measurable schemes realize all
The probabilistic secret sharing scheme S = 〈µ, h〉 is measurable if all recovery functions hA are
measurable. Requesting measurability seems to be a technical issue. It is not, as it is shown
in Theorem 3.2. The proof uses the following paradoxical construction of two random variables,
which shows that independence and determinacy are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Theorem 3.1 (G. Tardos, [16]). Let I denote the unit interval [0, 1]. There are two random
variables ξ and η with at joint distribution on I × I such that
a) both ξ and η are uniformly distributed on I,
b) ξ and η are independent,
c) both of them determine the others value uniquely.
Proof. The idea of the construction is to find a subset H ⊆ I × I with the following properties:
1) H is a graph of a bijection from I to I,
2) H has a point in every positive (Lebesgue) measurable subset of I × I.
When we have such an H , then define the σ-algebra Σ on H as the trace of the measurable sets
of I × I, and define the probability measure µ on Σ as
µ(U ∩H) = λ(U)
whenever U is a measurable subset of I × I. This definition is sound as if U1 ∩H = U2 ∩ H for
two measurable subsets U1 and U2, then property 2) above ensures λ(U1) = λ(U2). Let (ξ, η) be
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a random element of H distributed according to the measure µ. As H is a graph of a bijective
function, property c) evidently holds. Now let E ⊆ I be (Lebesgue) measurable. Then
Prob(ξ ∈ E) = µ(H ∩ (E × I)) = λ(E × I) = λ(E),
thus ξ is indeed uniformly distributed on I, and similarly for η. Finally, let E and F be measurable
subsets of I. Then
Prob( ξ ∈ E and η ∈ F ) = µ(H ∩ (E × F ))
= λ(E × F ) = λ(E) · λ(F )
= Prob( ξ ∈ E) · Prob( η ∈ F ),
which shows that ξ and η are independent, indeed.
Thus we only need to show how to find the subset H ⊂ I×I. We shall use transfinite induction
(thus the axiom of choice) to pick points of H . First note that every positive measurable set
contains a positive closed set, and there are only continuum many such sets. Let F ⊆ I × I be
closed and positive, then F contains a generalized continuum large grid. Namely, there are subsets
U , V ⊆ I such that both U and V have continuum many elements and U × V ⊆ F . Using these
properties we proceed as follows.
Enumerate all closed positive sets as Fα, and all real numbers in I as xα where α runs over
all ordinals less than c = 2ω. At each stage we add at most three points to H . Suppose we are
at stage indexed by α. As there is a continuum by continuum grid in Fα and until so far we
added less than continuum many points to H , there is a point in Fα such that neither its x nor its
y-coordinate has been chosen as an x (or y respectively) coordinate of any previous point. Add
this element of Fα to H . Then look at the real number xα. If there is no point in H so far with
an x-coordinate (or y-coordinate) equal to xα, then add the point (xα, z) (the point (z, xα)) to
H , where z is not among the y-coordinates (x-coordinates) of points in H so far.
The set H we constructed during this process satisfies properties 1) and 2). Indeed, every real
number in I will be a first (second) coordinate of some element of H . During the construction we
made sure that every horizontal (vertical) line intersects H in at most a single point. Thus H is
indeed a graph of a bijection of I. Finally H contains a point from each positive closed subset of
I × I, and thus from each positive measurable subset as well.
We remark that the bijection H encodes is not measurable in the product space (which, inci-
dentally, is the standard Lebesgue measure on I × I).
Theorem 3.2. Given any access structure A ⊂ 2P , there is a perfect non-measurable secret
sharing scheme realizing A.
Proof. Take the pair of random variables 〈ξ, η〉 from Theorem 3.1. Give everyone ξ as a share,
and set η as the secret.
ξ determines η, therefore qualified subsets can recover the secret.
ξ and η are independent, therefore unqualified subsets have “no information on the secret.”
Consequently this is a perfect probabilistic secret sharing scheme realizing A. We remark, that
it is not measurable, as the recovery function is not measurable.
4 Structures realized by (almost) perfect schemes
From this point on all schemes are assumed to be measurable. In this section we give a complete
characterization of access structures which can be realized by perfect and almost perfect schemes
as defined in Definition 2.8. Recall that an access structure A ⊂ 2P is open, if it is open in the
Sierpin´ski topology.
Monotone span programs were introduced by Karchmer and Wigderson in [11], and they are
used to define linear schemes. To fit to our purposes, we extend the notion of span programs
by allowing infinitely many participants and arbitrary vector spaces. If V is a vector space and
H ⊂ V , then the linear span of H is the set of all (finite) linear combinations of elements of H .
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Definition 4.1. Let P be the (possibly infinite) set of participants. A span program consists of a
vector space V , a target vector v ∈ V , and a function ϕ : P → 2V which assigns a (not necessarily
finite) collection of vectors to participants. The structure A ⊂ 2P realized by the span program is
defined as
A ∈ A ⇔ v ∈ linear span of
⋃
{ϕ(p) : p ∈ A}.
It is clear that structures realized by span programs are monotone and finitely generated.
Theorem 4.2. The following statements are equivalent for any access structure A ⊂ 2P .
1. A is realized by a span program;
2. A is realized by a perfect measurable probabilistic scheme;
3. A is realized by an almost perfect measurable probabilistic scheme;
4. A is open;
5. A is finitely generated.
Proof. The equivalence 4 ⇔ 5 is the statement of Claim 2.1. The implication 2 ⇒ 3 is trivial,
thus we need to prove the implications 3⇒ 5, 5⇒ 1, and 1⇒ 2.
3 ⇒ 5: We remark that A is finitely generated if and only if every qualified set contains a finite
qualified set. Suppose that the almost perfect scheme S = 〈µ, h〉 realizes A, and let c ≥ 1 be the
constant from Definition 2.8 equation (1).
Choose a subset E1 ⊂ Xs of the secrets so that both E1 and its complement E2 = Xs − E1 is
positive:
p1 = µs(E1) > 0, p2 = µs(E2) > 0,
and, of course, p1 + p2 = 1. Let A ∈ A be infinite, we must show that it has a finite qualified
subset. The recovery function hA is measurable, thus the sets Ui = h
−1
A (Ei) are measurable, and
µAs(U1 × E2) = µ
As(U2 × E1) = 0 as hA gives the right secret with probability 1. Consequently
µA(U1) = µ
As(U1 ×Xs) = µ
As(U1 × E1) + µ
As(U1 × E2) =
= µAs(U1 × E1) =
= µAs(U1 × E1) + µ
As(U2 × E1) =
= µAs(XA × E1) = µs(E1) = p1.
By item d) of Claim 2.7, for every positive ε > 0 there is a finite subset B ⊂ A such that setting
V1 = piB(U1) ⊆ X
B,
µBs(V1 × E2) < µ
As(U1 × E2) + ε = ε,
and, by item b) of the same Claim,
µB(V1) ≥ µ
A(U1) = p1.
Now we claim that if ε is small enough, then B is qualified. Indeed, S is almost perfect with
constant c, thus if B were unqualified then applying condition (1) for V1 ⊆ X
B and E2 ⊆ Xs we
get
1
c
· p1 · p2 ≤
1
c
· µB(V1) · µs(E2) ≤ µ
Bs(V1 × E2) < ε.
But this inequality clearly does not hold when ε is small enough, proving the implication.
5 ⇒ 1: Suppose A ⊂ 2P is finitely generated, say A = gen(B), where every B ∈ B is finite. Let
V be a large enough (infinite dimensional) vector space, and fix the target vector v ∈ V . We
want to assign vectors to participants so that v is in the linear span of the vectors assigned to
members of A ⊆ P if and only if A is qualified. This can be done as follows: for each B ∈ B (B
is finite!) choose |B| − 1 vectors from V which are linearly independent from everything chosen
so far (including the target vector), and set the |B|-th vector so that the sum of this |B| many
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vectors be equal to v. Assign these vectors to the members of B. A participant p ∈ P will receive
all vectors assigned to him.
1 ⇒ 2: If A ⊂ 2P is realized by any span program, then it is finitely generated. The proof of
the implication 5 ⇒ 1 above gives the stronger result that if A is finitely generated, then it can
be realized by a span program in which the vector space V is over some (in fact, any) finite field.
Thus if A can be realized by any span program, then it can be realized by a span program over a
finite field F.
Fix a base H of the vector space V , and for each h ∈ H the dealer picks rh ∈ F uniformly and
independently (this is where we need F to be finite). Write the goal vector in base H as the finite
sum v =
∑
j βjhj (hj ∈ H), and set the secret to be s =
∑
j βjrhj .
Next, suppose the participant p was assigned the vector x. Write x as a (finite) linear combi-
nation of base elements: x =
∑
i αihi, and then the dealer gives p the share 〈x,
∑
i αirhi〉. Thus p
receives a share (an element of F labeled by the public vector x) for each vector assigned to him.
It is clear that subsets of participants which have v in their linear span can compute the
secret (as an appropriate linear combination of certain shares), and shares of an unqualified set is
independent of the secret, as was required.
5 Structures realized by (almost) ramp schemes
In this section we give a characterization of access structures which can be realized by measurable
(almost) ramp schemes. The characterization uses the notion of Hilbert-space programs, which
is similar to that of span programs, only the vector space is replaced by a Hilbert space, and
the target vector should be in the closure of the linear span rather than in the linear span of the
generating vectors.
We also prove a generalization of the main result of Chor and Kushilevitz [5], which says that
if the scheme distributes infinitely many secrets, then the share domain of important participants
should be “large.” Finally we give a ramp scheme which distributes infinitely many secrets, while
every share domain is finite. Of course, in this scheme no participant can be important.
Definition 5.1. A Hilbert-space program consists of a Hilbert space H , a target vector v ∈ H , and
a function ϕ : P → 2H which assigns subsets of the Hilbert space to participants. The structure
A ⊂ 2P realized by the Hilbert-space program is defined as
A ∈ A ⇔ v ∈ closure of the linear span of
⋃
{ϕ(p) : p ∈ A}.
Theorem 5.2. The following statements are equivalent for any access structure A ⊆ 2P .
1. A is realized by a Hilbert-space program;
2. A is realized by a ramp measurable probabilistic secret sharing scheme;
3. A is realized by an almost ramp measurable scheme;
4. A is Gδ.
Proof. The implication 2 ⇒ 3 is trivial; we will show 1 ⇒ 2, 3 ⇒ 4 and 4 ⇒ 1. Also, we will use
Claim 2.3 which gives an equivalent characterization of Gδ structures.
3 ⇒ 4: Let S = 〈µ, h〉 be an almost ramp scheme which realizes A ⊂ 2P . As in the proof of
Theorem 4.2, choose E1 ⊂ Xs, E2 = Xs − E1 so that
p1 = µs(E1) > 0, p2 = µs(E2) > 0, p1 + p2 = 1.
As the set of all participants is always qualified, and hP is measurable, the sets Ui = h
−1
P (Ei) ⊆ XP
are measurable, µPs(U1 × E2) = µ
Ps(U2 × E1) = 0, and
µP (U1) = µ
Ps(U1 × E1) = p1.
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Let us define the family Bn of finite subsets of P as follows:
B ∈ Bn ⇔ B is finite, and µ
Bs(piB(U1)× E2) <
1
n
.
It is clear that Bn+1 ⊆ Bn, thus B =
⋂
n gen(Bn) is Gδ. We claim that a subset of participants is
qualified if and only it is in B. First, let A ⊆ P be qualified. Then gA = hP ◦piA is a (measurable)
recovery function for A, thus letting V1 = g
−1
A (E1), µ
As(V1 × E2) = 0, and then for each n there
is a finite Bn ⊆ A such that
µBns(piBn(V1)× E2) <
1
n
.
Observing that V1 = piA(U1), we get that A ∈ gen(Bn) for each n, as was required. In the other
direction, let B ⊆ P be not qualified, and let V1 = piB(U1) ⊆ X
B. As µB(V1) ≥ µ
P (U1) = p1 > 0
and µs(E2) = p2 > 0, the almost ramp property gives
µBs(V1 × E2) = µ
Bs(piB(U1)× E2) > 0.
For any subset B′ of B, µB
′s(piB′(U1) × E2) ≥ µ
Bs(V1 × E2), consequently B is not in genBn
when n ≥ 1/µBs(V1 × E2).
4 ⇒ 1: Let B1 ⊇ B2 ⊇ · · · be families of finite subsets of P such that A =
⋂
n gen(Bn), as given
by Claim 2.3. Then A ∈ A if and only if A is in gen(Bn) for infinitely many n. Let H be a huge
dimensional (not separable) Hilbert space, and fix an orthonormal base e1, e2, . . ., (countably
many elements) plus {e¯α : α ∈ I} for some index set I. The target vector will be
v = e1 +
e2
2
+
e3
3
+ · · · ,
and let vn =
∑n
i=1 ei/i. For each (finite) B ∈ Bn, the first |B| − 1 members of B will be assigned
new base elements from among e¯α, and the last member will be assigned an element from H so
that the sum of these |B| elements be equal to vn.
The target vector is in the closure of the linear span of Hilbert space elements assigned to
members of A ⊆ P if and only if vn is in their linear span for infinitely many n. But this
latter event happens if and only if A is in gen(Bn), thus this Hilbert-space program realizes A, as
required.
1⇒ 2: LetH be the (real) Hilbert space over which the program is defined, and fix an orthonormal
base {eα : α ∈ I} of H . For each element in this base assign a standard normal random variable
ξα so that they are totally independent. An element a ∈ H can be written as
a =
∑
λαeα, where
∑
λ2α <∞.
Assign the (random) variable ξa =
∑
λαξα to this element a ∈ H . More information about these
Gaussian spaces can be found in [9]. We list here only some basic properties which will be needed
for our construction.
The random variable ξa is normal with expected value 0 and variance ||a||
2, furthermore ξa
and ξb are independent if and only if a and b are orthogonal. If v is in the closure of the linear
span of E ⊆ H , then ξv is determined (with probability 1) by the values of {ξa : a ∈ E}.
Let L ⊆ H be a closed linear subspace. Any v ∈ H has an orthogonal decomposition v = v1+v2
such that v1 ⊥ L and v2 ∈ L. If v1 6= 0 then ξv has a conditional distribution given the values of
all ξa for a ∈ L, and this distribution is normal with variance ||v1||
2 (the expected value depends
on the values of the variables ξa).
We define a secret sharing scheme S realizing A as follows. Every domain will be either the
set of reals or some power of the reals. Let v ∈ H be the target vector. The secret is the value
of ξv. The share of participant p ∈ P is the collection of the values of ξa for all elements a ∈ H
assigned to p.
If A ⊆ P is qualified, then v is in the closure of the linear span, thus ξv is determined by the
shares of A. If B ⊆ P is unqualified, then the target vector is not in the closure of the linear
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span, let v1 6= 0 be its orthogonal component. The conditional distribution of the secret, given all
shares of B, is normal with ||v1||
2 variance. As the density function of the normal distribution is
nowhere zero, the probability that the secret is in the set E ⊆ R, both in the unconditional and in
the conditional case, is zero if and only if E is a zero set. Consequently this S is an almost ramp
scheme realizing A. It is easy to see, that this scheme is never ramp as the ratio of the conditional
and unconditional distribution function is never bounded.
However, it is easy to twist this scheme to be a ramp one. The only change is to set the secret
to be the fraction part of ξv, see this trick in [7]. As the density function of the fractional part
of a normal distribution is bounded (there is a c ≥ 1 such that it is between 1/c and c) and the
bound depends on the variation only, the conditional distribution of the secret, given the shares
of an unqualified set, is bounded, where the bound depends on the subset only, and not on the
actual values of the shares. Consequently this scheme is a ramp scheme realizing A.
Next we prove a generalization of the main result of Chor and Kushilevitz [5]. It follows from
a slightly more general theorem which we prove first.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose S is a measurable ramp scheme, A and B are disjoint unqualified sets
such that A ∪B is qualified. Suppose moreover that there are infinitely many secrets. Then µA is
atomless.
An immediate consequence of this theorem is that under the same conditions the set of shares
of A, namely XA, must have cardinality (at least) continuum.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that XA is atomic, and µX({a}) > 0 for some a ∈ XA. Partition
the set of secrets, Xs, into countably many positive sets Xs =
⋃
i Ei, where µs(Ei) > 0. Let h :
XA ×XB 7→ Xs be the function which determines the secret given the shares of A and B. Let
Vi = {y ∈ X
B : h(a, y) ∈ Ei}.
As h is measurable, each Vi is measurable, moreover the sets {a} × Vi × Ei and {a} ×X
B × Ei
have the same measure. Using the boundedness property for A we get
µBs(Vi × Ei) ≥ µ
ABs({a} × Vi × Ei)
= µABs({a} ×XB × Ei)
= µAs({a} × Ei)
≥
1
cA
· µA({a}) · µs(Ei).
Applying the boundedness twice for B we have
µBs(Vi × E1) ≥
1
cB
· µB(Vi) · µs(E1)
=
µs(E1)
c2B · µs(Ei)
· cBµ
B(Vi) · µs(Ei)
≥
µs(E1)
c2B · µs(Ei)
µBs(Vi × Ei)
≥
1
c2BcA
· µs(E1) · µ
A({a}),
where we used µ(Ei) > 0 and the previous estimate in the last step.
As h is defined on XA ×XB and
⋃
i Ei = Xs, we have
⋃
i Vi = X
B, furthermore the Vi’s are
pairwise disjoint. Thus
1 ≥ µBs(XB × E1) =
∑
i
µBs(Vi × E1) ≥
∑
i
( 1
c2BcA
· µs(E1) · µ
A({a})
)
,
which can happen only when µA({a}) = 0, a contradiction.
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A participant p ∈ P is important if there is an unqualified set B ⊆ P such that B ∪ {p} is
qualified.
Corollary 5.4. Suppose S is a measurable ramp scheme which distributes infinitely many secrets.
Then the share domain of every important participant must have cardinality at least continuum.
Proof. By assumption, no singleton is qualified, thus we can apply Theorem 5.3 with A = {p} and
the unqualified B such that A∪B is qualified. As µp is atomless, Xp must have at least continuum
many elements.
Quite surprisingly there are interesting ramp schemes where no participant is important, thus
this Corollary is not applicable. We sketch here a ramp scheme which distributes infinitely many
secrets, while every participant has a finite share domain – consequently no participant can be
important.
In our scheme participants are indexed by the positive integers, and Xs is also the set of
positive integers. The dealer chooses the secret s ∈ Xs with probability 2
−s. After choosing the
secret, she picks a threshold number t > s with probability 2−t+s. Participant with index i ≤ t
gets an integer from [1, i] uniformly and independently distributed, participant with index i > t
gets s as the share.
The secret can be recovered by any infinite set of participants as the eventual value of their
shares, while any finite set is unqualified. It is easy to see that this scheme is (measurable) ramp
realizing all infinite subsets of the positive integers, and have the required properties.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we looked at the theoretical problems of probabilistic secret sharing schemes. It is
quite natural to look at the classical secret sharing schemes from probabilistic point of view, and
even the first few steps towards an “abstract” definition is quite easy, interesting and unexpected
phenomena appear quite early. The non-measurable scheme in Section 3 was our first surprise.
Without such a “technical” restriction as the measurability of the recovery function, practically
we cannot say anything.
Characterizations of structures realizable by perfect schemes in Section 4 was more or less
straightforward. As can be seen in the companion paper [7], there are several exciting schemes
which limit how much information unqualified subsets might have which do not fit into any common
frame. Also, the following structure cannot be realized by any scheme which can be considered to
be “ramp” in any weak sense:
Let P be the lattice points in the positive quadrant; the minimal qualified sets are the
“horizontal” lines.
Suppose there are only two secrets (this can be done without loss of generality, use the same trick
as in the proof of Theorem 4.2). As the first row is qualified, there are finitely many elements
in the first row who can determine the secret up to probability at least 0.9. Similarly, there are
finitely many elements in the second row who know the secret up to probability 0.99; finitely many
from the third row who know the secret with probability 0.999, etc. The union of these finite sets
will know the secret with probability 1, thus it will be qualified, while it intersects each row in
finitely many elements. (We showed that this structure is not Gδ at the end of Section 2.2.)
The nice, and quite natural, characterization of ramp and almost ramp schemes in Section 5
hints that our definition of ramp schemes is “the” correct one. As remarked earlier, no universally
accepted definition exists for ramp schemes. One flavor of definition uses entropies. If A is qualified,
then the conditional entropy of the secret, given the shares of A, is zero, if the shares of B are
independent of the secret, then the conditional entropy equals the entropy of the secret. A scheme
is ramp, if for unqualified subsets, this conditional entropy is never zero. While this definition is
widely applied in getting lower bounds on the size of the shares in ramp schemes, it does not fit our
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definition. The correct translation would be requiring the min-entropy to be positive: the classical
scheme S is ramp if for each value the secret can take with positive probability, the conditional
probability of the same value for secret, given the value of the shares, is still positive. In other
words: in a ramp scheme unqualified subsets cannot exclude any possible secret value (while the
a posterior probability that the secret takes that value might be much smaller than the a priori
probability).
There are interesting probabilistic schemes in [7] which are weaker than the almost ramp
schemes defined in Definition 2.8. In those schemes unqualified subsets can exclude large subsets
of the secret space, while still remains some uncertainty. A typical example is when participant
i ∈ N+ has a uniform random real number from [0, 2−i] as a share, and the secret is the sum of
all shares. If participant i is missing, the rest can determine the secret up to an interval of length
2−i, and within that interval the secret is uniformly distributed. Is there any structure which can
be realized by such a scheme, but not by a ramp scheme? How can these type of schemes be
captured by a definition similar to that of ramp schemes?
Finally a question in other direction. Given an access structure A, is there an easy way to
recognize that it is Gδ? Given any collection of qualified and unqualified subsets, decide if there
is a Gδ structure in between. As a concrete example: given a collection of subsets of P , I want
any of them to be unqualified, but the union of any two of them to be qualified. Under what
conditions is there such a ramp scheme realizing this structure?
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